$Unique_ID{how04774} $Pretitle{} $Title{World Civilizations: The Classical Period In World History Analysis And Conclusion} $Subtitle{} $Author{Stearns, Peter N.;Adas, Michael;Schwartz, Stuart B.} $Affiliation{} $Subject{chinese war sunzi china warfare armies commanders dynasty han battle} $Date{1992} $Log{} Title: World Civilizations: The Classical Period In World History Book: Chapter 5: Unification And The Consolidation Of Civilization In China Author: Stearns, Peter N.;Adas, Michael;Schwartz, Stuart B. Date: 1992 Analysis And Conclusion Analysis: Sunzi And The Shift From Ritual Combat To "Real" War For better or worse, the development of classical civilizations in the Middle East, Greece, China, and India greatly advanced the business of making war. Agricultural surpluses made it possible to support specialized fighters and military commanders. Population growth made for larger armies that required armor and weapons and a certain amount of training. Horses, and in some areas camels and elephants, were raised to carry men into battle or pull war chariots. Advances in metalworking meant steadily improving weaponry, and the art of fortification became a major concern for early engineers and architects. Warfare came to involve more soldiers who fought for longer periods and suffered greater numbers of casualties. Frontier defenses and military campaigns became one of the prime concerns and main expenses for those who ruled civilized states. Despite advances in weaponry and training at least for warrior elites, warfare in most early civilizations was a combination of ritual and chaotic brawl. Wars were not fought during harvest times, winter months, or months when the monsoon rains arrived. A ruler was expected to announce his intention to attack a neighboring kingdom well in advance. Before battle, the high priests of each ruler offered sacrifices to the gods and their readings of various sorts of omens, not strategic considerations, determined the time and place of combat. Battles consisted primarily of formal duels between trained and well-armed warriors in the midst of rather confused collisions of masses of poorly trained and armed foot soldiers, who were usually slaves or forcibly recruited peasants. Though often fierce, the warriors' duels were in theory regulated by codes of honor and fair play. It was unseemly, for example, for one champion to strike another from behind or when his opponent had fallen. Defeated champions, if they lived, were treated with great respect. Individual initiative and deeds of heroism were at a premium. Duels between warrior champions were the setpiece of a battle. As the great epics of early civilizations, such as the Indian Mahabharata and the Greek Iliad, demonstrate graphically, great warriors cut bloody swaths through the ranks of poorly prepared infantry and lesser fighters to get to each other and set up the hand-to-hand combats that normally determined the outcome of battle. The death of a commander, who was often the ruler of the kingdom at war or a renowned champion, meant the collapse of his forces and their chaotic flight from the field. Normally the victorious army did not destroy or capture what remained of the opposing soldiers. The game had been played and won. The winners either retired with their booty to prepare for the next round or began negotiations to determine the terms on which the defeated party would submit to their overlordship. The Shang and Early Zhou periods of Chinese history were filled with wars and most of them were fought according to this ritualized pattern. But by the Late Zhou period, some commanders and thinkers had become highly critical of the indecisiveness and waste of the endless conflicts between the warring states. In the 4th century B.C., Sunzi, an advisor to one of the warring monarchs, responded to these concerns with a treatise on The Art of War, which stands as one of the great classics of military theory. In opposition to the ritualized approach to war, Sunzi proposed a very different vision of military conflict. He argued that war was merely an extension of statecraft. Wars ought not to be games or macho contests for bragging rights; they ought to be fought only for ends that increased the territory, wealth, and power of the state. With these aims in mind, Sunzi insisted that speed was of the essence in warfare, and that long wars burdened the subjects of the warring rulers and bred rebellions. He also urged that target kingdoms be captured as swiftly as possible and with as little damage as possible. Sunzi argued that war was a science and as such it should be the object of extensive study. Rather than brawny warriors, commanders ought to be men well versed in organization, strategy, and tactics. He proposed, and Chinese rulers subsequently set up, special schools to train officers in the art of war. Sunzi's ideas transformed warfare in China. Rulers made every effort to bring down rivals short of war. Bluffs, spies, threats, and saboteurs were employed before armies were actually sent to war. Both before and after war was actually declared, substantial state resources and large bureaucracies were devoted to building and training armies and supplying them in the field. Here the greater power of the shi officials in the Late Zhou era played a critical role. As the backup for victorious armies, Shi thinkers stressed the importance of a ruler's ability to mobilize the resources and population of his kingdom as fully as possible. Sneak attacks were considered fair, and feints and ruses were regularly employed by field commanders. Weather conditions and advantageous terrain rather than the auguries of soothsayers determined the time and place of battle. Successful generals were trained, and their soldiers were far better drilled than in earlier times. Psychological devices were strongly recommended. For example, techniques were used to make the enemy commanders angry and cause them to make foolish moves that might demoralize their armies. Discipline rather than individual heroics was required. This point was driven home by a ruler who had one of his commanders beheaded because the general's troops attacked ahead of schedule, despite the fact that this action was the key to victory. In combat, regular formations replaced mass brawls; soldiers fought as units under the direction of a chain of commanders. Good fighters were still valued, but now as unit leaders rather than accomplished duelists. Quarter for a wounded enemy was less likely to be given. The main object of battle became the destruction of the enemy's forces as quickly as possible. The aim of warfare became the conquest of a rival kingdom or the defense of one's own. Shi Huangdi's military and political successes demonstrated how effective the reorganization of warfare along the lines suggested by Sunzi might be. Halfway across the globe, the Greeks were independently developing comparable patterns of warfare. In roughly the same era as Sunzi and Shi Huangdi, the discipline and training of the smaller Greek armies culminated in Alexander the Great's unprecedented conquests. But these successes by no means put an end to ritual warfare between civilized peoples. Though Chinese armies tended to be organized and led according to the prescriptions of Sunzi and other theorists, the chivalric codes and battles centered on the duels of champions showed a remarkable staying power. This was particularly true of societies that were dominated by warrior elites, such as those that later developed in India, Japan, and Europe. But conditions in the warring states and the genius of Sunzi had led to a radically new vision of what wars were about and how they would be fought. The effects of this vision are still felt by civilized societies. Conclusion: An Era Of Accomplishment And Affluence The four centuries of Han rule from roughly 200 B.C. to A.D. 200 represented the first wave in a cyclic succession of dynasties that would rule China until the 20th century. Through more than two millennia, a fairly predictable pattern was followed. Local rebellions would culminate in the overthrow of an existing dynasty, which had either become overly oppressive, such as the Qin, or too weak to rule effectively. For a crntury or so, the rulers of the new dynasty would be effective and consequently China would be relatively peaceful and prosperous. After a period of decline, one or two capable emperors would restore the dynasty's fortunes for a time. But then, roughly two centuries after the dynasty had been founded, prolonged decline would set in. Foreign invasions, natural calamities, corruption, and civil strife would sap whatever strength the dynasty had and turn the populace against it. Rebellions, usually led by disaffected members of the army and shi elite but sometimes led by peasants would erupt. The dynasty would be overthrown and a new one proclaimed to succeed it. The cycle would begin anew. Prolonged periods of political division and civil strife followed the fall of some dynasties, most notably the Han. Yet there was considerable social and institutional continuity from one dynasty to the next. Though Chinese civilization expanded and changed significantly in areas as fundamental as the social composition of the ruling elite, marriage arrangements, and religion, key elements came together in the Han period that persisted into the 20th century. Among these were the assumption that political unity was natural and desirable; the principle of rule by an emperor served by a professional bureaucracy; and the dominance in political, social, and cultural life of the educated shi elite. Most Chinese also had a deep veneration for tradition and their ancestors, and laid great stress on the importance of maintaining social harmony, self-restraint, and decorum in dealings within the family and in the wider society. These core elements ensured not just that Chinese civilization would survive, but that the Han would be just the first of a succession of dynastic eras marked by major achievements in virtually all spheres of human endeavor. Classical China did not produce an entirely unified culture or complete social harmony. Major philosophical and religious schools disagreed widely about the nature of "man" and the goals of life. Many ordinary people knew little of the ideas of the great Chinese philosophers such as Confucius and Laozi. They continued to believe in a variety of gods and spirits, which were often associated with the home and kitchen, and developed rituals and offerings to placate these supernatural beings. The elite-mass gap in Chinese culture was considerable, in part because Chinese writing was so difficult to master that only a smalllelite had time and money enough to learn to read and write. Despite these divisions and differences, the short-lived Qin dynasty and four centuries of Han rule had established the basic components of a civilization that would last for thousands of years. As the achievements of the classical age demonstrate, it was to be one of the most creative and influential civilizations of all human history. The strength of its agrarian base has allowed China to carry about one-fourth of the total human population from the last centuries B.C. to the present day. The productivity of its peasants has allowed the Chinese to support some of the world's largest cities and one of history's largest and most creative elites. Over the centuries, Chinese textiles, porcelain, and inventions have been traded over much of the globe and have spurred technological revolutions in regions as distant as Japan and Europe. In the Han era, the Chinese established the first universities, the first civil service exams, and humanity's most enduring bureaucracy. In the same period, they consolidated a distinguished tradition in political philosophy, and began artistic experimentation that would yield rich rewards under later dynasties. The civilization of China that came together in the classical age of the Qin and Han was destined to dominate the history of much of Asia and contribute significantly to the advance of civilized life throughout the globe.